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Abstract
Despite the importance of principal-agent models in the development of modern
economic theory, there are few estimations of these models. We contribute to ﬁll this
gap in a ﬁeld where moral hazard has traditionally been considered important: the
utilization of health care services. This paper presents a model where the individual
decides to have treatment or not when she suﬀers an illness spell. The decision is taken
on the basis of comparing beneﬁts and out-of-pocket monetary costs of treatment. In
the paper, we recover the estimates of the corresponding principal agent model and
obtain an approximation to the optimal contract.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Contract theory has been extremely important in the development of modern economic
theory during the last thirty years. However, the increasing sophistication of the theory
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1has not gone hand in hand with empirical validation of the models as Salani´ e (1997) points
out. Chiappori and Salani´ e (2000) oﬀer us an up to date perspective of the literature that
has tried to link econometrics and contract theory. Most of the existing works have used a
reduced form approach.1 Obtaining policy recommendations from reduced form models is
usually a diﬃcult task. Firstly, estimates of the raw economic parameters (technology and
preferences) are usually necessary to ﬁnd the policy function. Secondly, the parameters of
reduced form models are a function of the raw parameters and agents’ constraints, which
would in general shift in case a policy change takes place (Lucas, 1976).
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the structural parameters (preferences and
technology) of a principal-agent model involving moral hazard. This will allow us to solve
for the optimal policy function, i.e. the optimal contract. We concentrate on the problem
of health care insurance. Moral hazard arises because health shocks are not contractible,
hence contracts are not complete. Consequently, it might be optimal to give incentives to
the consumer in order for her not to have expensive treatments for minor health shocks.
Our main contribution is to estimate the parameters of a principal-agent model with
moral hazard. This allows to use the principal-agent paradigm when solving for the
optimal contract. This presents the following advantages. First, principal-agent models
have developed in the last thirty years as a rigorous framework where the moral hazard
concept has been widely studied. Second, when following this approach, the analyst has to
make a clear distinction between contractible and non contractible variables. The relation
between contractible and non-contractible variables provide important information when
deriving the optimal contract. In a reimbursement health care setting, it is natural to
think that the non contractible variable is a health shock, while the contractible one is
the treatment cost. One would expect a strong but stochastic relation between health
shocks and treatment costs. This will be important when deriving the optimal contract
since a large cost tells much about the health shock. This will also be the basis for a new
measure of moral hazard that we will propose: the correlation between the unobservable
that inﬂuence both severity and treatment costs. Third, the optimal contract is obtained
directly from ﬁrst principles and does not need to do further assumptions on which is the
ﬁrst best level of health care utilization.
Moral hazard in the use of medical services has been one of the most recurrent issues
1Some exceptions are Ferrall and Shearer (1999), Margiotta and Miller (2000), Paarsch and Shearer
(2000) and Biais et al. (1999).
2in health economics. Early references about the topic are Arrow (1963), Pauly (1968) and
Zeckhauser (1970). The more widespread view is that
“When moral hazard is present, insurance that reduces risk will also cause larger
expected losses. In medical care, these losses represent the consumption of units of medical
care whose value to the consumer is less than their cost, because the insurance coverage
reduce the user price below cost”(Pauly, 1986).
Previous papers have tried to estimate optimal health care insurance contracts.2 Their
methodology is based on optimal taxation rather than asymmetric information theory.
Regarding the relation between the insurance problem and optimal taxation, medical
insurance might induce a distortion on the consumption of health care services, since
it lowers the marginal price of consumption. In this respect, the problem of optimal
taxation is similar to optimal health insurance. However as Belsey (1988) points out,
there is a crucial diﬀerence between them: the insurance problem is against a background
of incomplete markets. These previous approaches are based on comparing the welfare loss
of a given insurance contract with respect to the situation of no insurance. Consequently
they assume that the ﬁrst best level of health care services correspond to the one where
there is no insurance. Ma and Riordan (2001) have shown that this assumption does
not verify in presence of income eﬀects. In fact, the implementation of the ﬁrst best
requires the consumer to be responsible for only a fraction of treatment costs, because his
marginal valuation of income rises once out of pocket payment is paid out of her income.
This corresponds to the early observation by Meza (1983) for which previous approaches
might be overestimated welfare losses due to moral hazard, in presence of income eﬀects.
This paper diﬀers from previous approaches in several dimensions. First, in previous
approaches, the individual decision was the amount of monetary resources dedicated to
health care. Though this is a simplifying assumption, it is undesirable for two reasons.
First, since the individual has a demand curve for resources dedicated to health care, then
it is assumed that the larger the health care costs, the larger the utility is. However, it
seems preferable to disentangle quantity consumed from the cost of producing it, since the
individual will derive utility form quantity but not from the cost of production. There is a
second reason why it is undesirable to model individual decision as the amount of monetary
resources dedicated to health care. This way of modelling consumer behavior contradicts
2Feldstein (1973), Feldman and Dowd (1991), Buchanan et al (1991), Newhouse (1993) and Manning
and Marquis (1996).
3one of the basic ﬁndings from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. In fact, Keeler
and Rolph (1998) and Newhouse(1993) found that generosity of insurance plans mainly
inﬂuence the decision whether to seek treatment or not against an illness episode, rather
than treatment costs. This is not strange given the asymmetry of information between
patient and physician. In our model, individual will decide whether to have treatment
or not against an illness spell with some level of severity. The costs of treatment will be
given to the individual as a technological relation. Our choice, though more complicated
from an econometric point of view, allows to disentangle quantity from costs and mimics
better the decision pattern found in health care consumption by Keeler and Rolph (1998)
and Newhouse(1993). An important advantage from this approach is that we can exploit
the stochastic relation between costs and health shocks when we solve for the optimal
contract. If treatment costs tell much about health shocks, then the problem of moral
hazard is alleviated, since the insurer can infer the value of the non contractible variables
from the contractible ones.3 This will be our basis to propose a new measure of moral
hazard based on the correlation between unobservables that health shocks and the ones
that inﬂuence cost of treatment. Consequently, this measure is based on the informational
content that contractible variables have over non contractible ones.
Our second main diﬀerence with previous literature is that we derive the optimal
contract from ﬁrst principles, that is the solution of the principal-agent problem. Conse-
quently, we do not have to do any assumption regarding which is the ﬁr s tb e s tl e v e lo f
health care consumption, as previous approaches have to do.4 As it is explained above, this
is specially important when income eﬀects are present. As we have emphasized before, if
income eﬀects are important, previous approaches might have overestimated welfare losses
(Meza, 1983). It is important to have a methodology to assess consumer cost-sharing in
presence of income eﬀects, since it is not clear yet if they are a prevalent feature of the
health care insurance market.5
3Buchanan et. al. (1991) do dissentangle quantity consumed and health care costs, but they disregard
the correlation between contractible and non contractible variables and they do not obtain the optimal
insurance plan from ﬁrst principles.
4Blomqvist (1997) is an exception, but our model diﬀers from hers in the rest of dimensions we have
mentioned before.
5Evidence of income eﬀects have been found by Newhouse (1993), Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995), Manning
and Marquis (1996), Gurmu (1997), Holly et al. (1998) and Creel and Farrell (2001), while Deb and Trivedi
(1997) does not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect.
4Consumer cost sharing is an important policy issue. In the last US presidential elec-
tions, an increase in the coverage of pharmaceuticals for the elderly was part of President
Bush electoral program. On July 1993 in France, the social security cost sharing for ambu-
latory care and pharmaceutical goods was reduced in a 5% (Chiappori et al. 1998). In an
attempt to control rising public health care costs, the Belgian government has raised coin-
surance rates several times over the period 1986-1995 with a sharp increase in 1994 (Van
de Voorde et al. 2000). In the UK, policy change has reduced eligibility for publicly pro-
vided treatment, increased copayments for dental, opthalmic services and pharmaceuticals
(Propper, 2000) and reduce state ﬁnanced care at the margins (Propper et al., 2001). In
Spain, doctor visits are free but consumers are charged 40% for outpatient drugs charges.
Along this introduction we have used the term reimbursement health care insurance.
We are studying the case where the consumer gets reimbursed her health care expenses
according to the insurance contract, but there is no contractual relation between health
care provider and insurer. The contract that we obtain is contingent on a cost function
that is partly determined by the incentives that the provider faces. If provider incentives
change, this will change our cost function and then the optimal contract. Although it
would be desirable, we do not have data available to determine the optimal mix between
provider and consumer incentives.6 However, our model points out how this could be
achieved. This is thanks to the separation between quantity demanded and treatment
costs. Close to this, we focus on the contract for outpatient non dental and non mental
treatments. As Belsey (1988) points out, there is no reason to think that all kinds of health
care services should have face the same contract. Dental care is normally subject to higher
degrees of patient cost sharing than standard outpatient treatment, while hospitalization
expenses usually have much wider insurance coverage. We highlight that previous papers
used all types of treatments in order to obtain the insurance contract.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe how the individual chooses
to have treatment or not when suﬀering an illness episode by comparing out of pocket costs
of treatment and the health penalty of not obtaining treatment. This follows the tradition
health economics research in which the consumer is responsible for the contact decision,
but not for the amount of treatment. In Section 3 we describe the data that we use, that
comes from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, that randomly assigned individuals
6Ellis and McGuire (1993) argue that demand side cost-sharing might be desirable even in Health
Maintance Organizations.
5to insurance plans. Consequently, for the estimation, we do not need to assume that
observed contracts are optimal and we can condition on the insurance contract without
the need of dealing with endogeneity issues. Section 4 describes the econometric strategy
followed to estimate the model. Section 5 gives the results of a preliminary analysis and
Section 6 discuss the estimates of the structural parameters, and evaluates the suitability
of the model. Section 7 sets up the principal-agent problem and explains the numerical
technique to solve for the optimal contract. The last section concludes.
2 The demand model
2.1 Individual decision problem
This section is devoted to modeling the individual’s decision concerning whether to be
treated or not when suﬀering an illness spell. This model is the basis for the estimation of
the parameters of the principal-agent model. In our set-up, the consumer faces a speciﬁc
insurance contract that will inﬂuence her decision. Given that in our dataset, individuals
were randomly assigned to insurance contracts, we do not describe how individuals chose
among diﬀerent insurance choices.
Our model is inspired in the baseline model of Ma and Riordan (1997). At the end
of this section, we will specify the diﬀerence between our model and theirs. We build
the model based on the following hypotheses: First, the individual decides whether to be
treated or not but she does not decide the cost of treatment. We justify this on the basis
of the informational asymmetry between doctor and patient. We will also assume that
the doctor chooses treatment costs independently of individual’s insurance coverage and
income. This corresponds to the situation where the medical guideline that the doctor
follows does not take into account individual economic characteristics but gives the most
cost-eﬀective treatment. Consequently, we will assume that treatment costs come from a
given technological relation.
Second, the individual is rational and compares beneﬁts and costs when she decides.
This might be a strong assumption when one is dealing with severe illnesses for which the
individual lacks experience and can hardly value the beneﬁts and costs of the treatment.
Furthermore, the treatment decision in the case of very severe illnesses might depend
on long term eﬀects that we are not ready to model. In the empirical application we will
restrict the type of illness spells that we study in order to make our rationality assumption
6is more likely to hold.
We assume the individual is endowed with a health capital stock s,a n da ni n c o m e
level y. An individual will be ill when she receives a penalty health shock of magnitude
s>0. There will be a stochastic relation between s and s, given by the conditional density
function fs|s. If s ≤ 0, the individual is not ill and therefore treatment is not demanded. We
assume the support of s is (−∞,+∞).With this speciﬁcation the illness process follows
the same determinants as the health penalty process. We will justify this in terms of
requirements for identiﬁcation in the section devoted to the econometric speciﬁcation.
The individual is under the coverage of an insurance contract that under premium p
reimburses the cost of the treatment c, if the individual agrees to pay the quantity D(c),
where D(.) is a non-negative function speciﬁed in the insurance contract. This function
gives the cost sharing agreement between insurer and insured. The health penalty shock
and cost of treatment variables will follow a joint density function conditional on the health






fs|s if s ≤ 0 and c =0
fs,c|s,c if s > 0 and c > 0.
(1)
The ﬁrst part of the density function implies that costs cannot be positive when the
individual is not ill (s ≤ 0), since there is no need for treatment.
The timing of the model is as follows. First the individual receives a random draw of
(s,c)f r o mt h ej o i n td e n s i t ygs,c|s,c. When the individual suﬀers an illness spell (s>0),
she will obtain diﬀerent utilities depending on her decision regarding treatment. We will
assume that the individual knows the health penalty s and the cost c when she decides. We
reckon that this might be a strong assumption but it is diﬃcult to ﬁgure out an estimable
demand model where the consumer knows neither the price nor the good she is buying.
In the empirical application, we restrict the type of illness spells that we consider in order
to make this assumption more plausible. We also assume that in case the treatment is
obtained, there is perfect healing and the initial level of health is recuperated. As before,
we think that restricting the types of illness spell that we consider might help to make this
assumption more plausible. If treatment at cost c is obtained, the individual will have to
pay the quantity D(c). Speciﬁcally, the consumer’s ex-post utility will be
7U(y − p,s), if ill with health penalty s but treatment is not obtained
U(y − p − D(c),0), if ill and treatment is obtained with D(c) as out of pocket payment
U(y − p,0), if consumer is not ill.
(2)
We assume that U(.,.) is increasing and concave in the ﬁrst argument, while decreasing
and convex in the second.
In what follows, we will describe the individual decision problem. Given that the
set of actions is discrete (to have or not to have treatment), it is of interest to look for
the health penalty threshold, that given a cost, leaves the individual indiﬀerent between
having treatment or not. For each cost c there is a unique value of s = e s(c) ≥ 0 such that
U(y − p,e s(c)) = U(y − p − D(c),0).
Given c, the uniqueness comes from U(y−p,0) >U(y−p−D(c),0) and the fact that the
utility function is strictly decreasing in the second argument. Consequently we make the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 The health penalty threshold is the function e s(c) such that U(y − p,e s(c)) =
U(y − p − D(c),0).
Given a draw of (s,c) from the joint distribution above, the individual will decide to





1 if s > e s(c)
0 if s ≤ 0 or 0 <s<e s(c).
(3)
The intuition is very simple. The individual will decide not to have treatment (T =0 )
either when she is not ill (s<0) or when the health penalty shock does not oﬀset the
out of pocket monetary cost of the treatment (0 <s<e s(c)). Notice that e s(c) depends
on the cost sharing function D(c). In particular, if the contract does not specify any out
of pocket payment, D(c) = 0 for all c, then the individual will decide to have treatment
when she is ill independently of the costs of the treatment.
8As we said at the beginning of the section, the model is inspired in the baseline model
by Ma and Riordan (1997). However, there are some diﬀerences. In our model, the illness
probability and the health penalty shock are drawn from the same distribution, while
in their model, both processes are modelled independently. We need this assumption in
order to be able to identify the parameters in estimation. However, in our model, costs are
random Ma and Riordan (1997) insurance model is for a speciﬁc illness and they assume
that costs are ﬁxed and do not vary with the health penalty shock.
2.2 Expected results on observed costs per episode
The structural model above allow us to analyze how the observed costs per episode vary
with the copayment rates. To our knowledge, the literature has not discussed this issue
using a theoretical demand model before. We will see that observed costs per episodes
are decreasing in the generosity of insurance coverage, even if neither the patient nor the
doctor decides to spend less in a treatment. The following lemma and proposition clariﬁes
our point:
Lemma 2 For a given premium, p, and for every cost, c, given D(c)=kc, the health
penalty threshold function e s(c) is increasing in the copayment, k.
Proof. This result directly comes from Deﬁnition 1. The greater is k,t h es m a l l e r
is the value of U(y − p − kc,0), and consequently, s must be greater for the equality in
Deﬁnition 1 to hold.
This means that the greater the copayment, the greater must be the health penalty in
order to ask for treatment. In the following proposition we will see that this implies that
observed costs are expected to be smaller for those individuals with greater copayments.
Proposition 3 For a given premium, p, observed costs of treatment are decreasing in the
copayment rate.

















9given that fs,c|s,c(e s(c),c) is positive since it is a density function, and the derivative of e s(c)
with respect to k is positive according to the previous lemma.
The intuition is as follows: given a health penalty, those with a large copayment will
ask for treatment only if the treatment is inexpensive enough. Consequently, observed
costs are expected to be smaller for those individuals with greater copayments. Notice
that this holds in a framework where nobody chooses treatment costs, but they are given
by a technological relation. The key assumption is that individuals are able to anticipate
treatment costs. We will see in Section 5 that the data verify this relation.
3T h e D a t a
3.1 The experiment
The data that we use come from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE), a social
experiment conducted between 1975 and 1982 in six diﬀerent cities of USA. Families
participating in the experiment were randomly assigned to one of fourteen diﬀerent fee-for
service health insurance plans. More information about the experiment can be obtained
in Manning et al. (1987) and Newhouse et al. (1993). Keeler and Rolph (1988), Manning
and Marquis (1996), Marquis and Holmer (1996), Deb and Trivedi (1999) and Guilleski
and Mroz (2000) have previously used this data.
We would like to highlight two important characteristics of the dataset. First, insurance
plans are exogenous to the individuals. Individuals did not choose the insurance plan
they were enrolled, but they were randomly assigned to it. Participation incentives were
paid to minimize the risk of attrition bias. Therefore the analyst does not need to face
the endogeneity problem of insurance coverage, that is, the possibility that less healthy
people, anticipating large medical expenditures, buy more generous insurance coverage.
Second, it gives information on illness episodes. Charges on claims from providers
were grouped to create episodes of treatment. The grouping was based primarily on
diagnosis, time since last charge for a related diagnosis, and information from the provider
on treatment history. For each episode, the dataset contains information on total expenses,
beginning and ending date, as well as the type of episode and the principal provider of
the service. According to the type of the episode, they were classiﬁed as acute, chronic,
chronic ﬂare-up,7 well-care and prenatal/maternity. The classiﬁcation for providers include
7Temporary problem in a usually controlled condition.
10hospital inpatient, hospital outpatient, physician, dentist, pharmacy and nonpharmacy
supplier. The classiﬁcation of the provider is hierarchical, that is, outpatient services
preceding or following a hospitalization were included in a hospital provider. Drugs and
tests were part of the episode in which they were prescribed. This exhaustive information
about episodes is important for us, since we are using a behavioral model that assumes that
p a t i e n t sk n o wt h ec o s ta n ds e v e r i t yo ft h et r e a t m e n t .T h i sw i l lb eu s e f u lw h e nw er e s t r i c t
the type of illness spells that we will use. More information on the way episodes were
constructed can be obtained from Keeler and Rolph (1988) and references thereinafter.
Using information on episodes has an important advantage: one can separately study
decisions to start episodes of treatment and decisions on the amount of treatment (cost of
treatment). The decision to start an episode of treatment is mainly done by the patient,
while the doctor, or the doctor jointly with the patient, will decide on the amount of
treatment (or cost). Therefore, it is desirable to be able to study these two decisions
separately.
The fee-for-service plans of the experiment had diﬀerent levels of cost sharing that
varied over two dimensions: the copayment rate (the percentage of the cost of each insur-
ance claim that the individual pay out of her pocket) and an upper limit on annual out
of pocket expenditures called Maximum Dollar Expenditure (MDE). Consequently, the
family only paid according to the copayment if the total out of pocket expenditures had
not exceed the MDE. The copayment rates were 0, 25, 50 or 95 percent. Depending on
the plan, the MDE was 5,10, or 15 percent of the previous year’s income, with a maximum
of $1000.8 In section 3.3, we will comment on the consequences of this MDE.
3.2 Our sample
In this subsection we will make speciﬁc the sample we have used in our estimation. We will
begin to comment on the types of episodes used. In our structural model, the individual
might receive a health penalty shock. This is not compatible with well care episodes
nor with prenatal/maternity episodes. Nor are chronic treatments compatible with our
model, since they are routine treatments. Therefore, the individual will predict them at
the beginning of the contract year. We will not consider inpatient episodes since they
8Apart from the ones mentioned above, there was a HMO plan, as well as an individual deductible plan
that limited annual out-of-pocket outpatient expenditures to $150 per person, with a 95% of copayment
rate for outpatient expenditures. These ones will not be used in this study.
11are probably too severe and the individual could hardly decide on the basis of economic
factors. We do not consider either dental episodes, since they were not usually covered
by insurance contracts in those years and consumers showed an opportunistic behavior
during the experiment. We do not analyze mental care episodes since they have diﬀerent
determinants and, even with generous insurance coverage, relatively little was spent on
outpatient mental health care at the time the experiment was conducted.
Consequently, we have only considered acute and chronic-ﬂare-up outpatient episodes.
Acute episodes (Newhouse et al. 1993) are deﬁned by unforeseen and undeferrable treat-
ment opportunities. From an economic point of view, spending on these episodes will occur
only when the patient is temporarily sick. Consequently our model might be appropriate
to deal with acute episodes. Chronic ﬂare-up episodes are much as acute episodes, but
they are caused by a chronic condition. Since we have not considered inpatient episodes,
most of the episodes will be because of relatively minor conditions. It is important to
have a relatively homogenous types of illness episodes, since in general the consumption of
diﬀerent health care commodities will imply diﬀerent insurance contracts associated with
them (Belsey 1988).
A subsample of individuals were enrolled in the experiment during ﬁve contract years
(contracts had a duration of 365 days but not natural years, so they were called contract
years), but most of them were enrolled only three contract years. We will use observations
on the third contract year, so we are sure that individuals were familiar with the conditions
of the insurance contract oﬀered by the experiment.9
Our model does not allow for multiple spells. As we will see, the econometric im-
plementation needs to account for sample selection in costs since we do not observe the
treatment costs of those that were ill but did not seek treatment. Consequently, the model
is already quite complicated in order to account for multiple spells. Therefore, our depen-
dent variable will be a dichothomous variable that takes value 1 if the individual started
to be treated by a new episode during the ﬁrst month of the contract year.10 As Table
4.1 indicates few people started more than one episode in the ﬁrst month. As Guilleski
9In the section devoted to preliminary analysis, we explain why we chose the third year instead of the
second one.
10More speciﬁcally, during the second day of the contract-year and the following 30 days. Medical
expenses in the new contract year that were generated by illness episodes that started in the preceeding
contract year were recorded as starting the ﬁrst day of the new contract year. We want to exclude them,
since they are not decisions taken in the current contract year.
12(1998), in case of starting more than one episode in the month, we take the ﬁrst one.
Therefore, we only have one observation per person.
Moreover, we only consider people older than 17, in order to consider episodes which
are decided by the individual and not by their parents.11 We do not consider either people
that were self-employed. They were very few in the sample and might diﬀer much in their
opportunity costs of having a treatment. Since we do not have information about this
opportunity cost, we prefer not to include them in the analysis. Finally we deleted ob-
servations with missing values in relevant variables. Table 4.3 gives the description of the
variables used, as well as the descriptive statistics of the observations used in the estima-
tion. All the monetary variables are in 1973 dollars.12 We used monthly medical consumer
price index to deﬂate treatment costs. Individuals participating in the experiment did not
pay any insurance premium.
3.3 The maximum dollar expenditure and the copayment rate
In our estimation we will condition on the individual’s copayment rate. Therefore, it is
important that the copayment rate we condition on is the same one that the individual
uses to decide on demand for treatment. As Keeler et al. (1977), Ellis (1986), Keeler and
Rolph (1988) and Newhouse et al. (1993) have noted, the existence of a cap on out of
pocket payments may make the eﬀective marginal price and the nominal price diﬀer (the
copayment rate we condition on). If individuals were able to anticipate exceeding the cap
with certain probability, then the eﬀective marginal price will be smaller than the nominal
one.
We have reasons to think that in our case this is a minor problem. First, according to
Newhouse et al. (1993) “Few participants [in the HIE experiment] proved able to anticipate
exceeding the MDE, which allowed us to ignore this factor and to obtain a much more
tractable estimation problem”. In addition, they show that the size of the remaining
MDE was important in the decision to initiate hospital episodes, but not to initiate other
episodes type. Consistent with the same idea, Keeler and Rolph (1988) showed that people
participating in the experiment adopted a mixture of myopic and inﬂexible behavior. That
is, if expenditures did not exceed the MDE, then they responded to current copayments.
Once out of pocket expenditures exceeded the MDE, people did not instantly adapt to
11Eligible individuals for the experiment were younger than 61.
12We have deﬂacted because we have several years, as noted in the beginning of this section
13the zero price of medical care, but they took some time to do so.
O u ra n a l y s i si sb a s e do nt h eﬁrst month and for episodes that took as much one month.
Given the references above that apply to the same data that we use, families should be
far from either exceeding the MDE or anticipating to exceed the MDE. Therefore, we feel
conﬁdent on conditioning on the current copayment rate.
4E c o n o m e t r i c s p e c i ﬁcation
4.1 Functional form assumptions
In this section, we will give speciﬁc functional forms to the demand model described above
in order to carry out the estimation. We will start by the density function. The health
penalty random variable, s, follows a normal distribution with mean s = xsβs. That is,
s = xsβs + εs,
where xs is a vector of covariates, βs a conformable vector of parameters and εs is an










where φ(.) is the standardized normal density function.
The cost per episode will be given by
lnC = αln(s +1 )+xcβc + εc,
where xc is a vector of covariates, βc a conformable vector of parameters and εc is an
unobservable component. Notice that the individual is ill only when s>0, so the function
above is well deﬁned in the appropriate range. Inside the logarithm in the left hand side,
we add one to the health penalty. This ensures that the cost increases with α for any
s>0. The functional form above is convenient since the predicted cost is always positive
for any value of the parameters. All the previous studies cited above that estimated cost
equations also used a logarithm transformation.
It will be assumed that (εs,εc) follows a bivariate normal distribution with null means









14By means of a change of variable we can obtain the joint density of (s,c), when both








lnc − αln(s +1 )− xcβc
σc
;ρ), (4)
where b(.,.;ρ) is the standardized bivariate normal with correlation coeﬃcient equal to ρ.
We will specify two types of utility functions, previously proposed by Ma and Riordan
(1997). When the individual is ill with health penalty s, but does not have treatment, the
utility function will be either,13
UI(y − p,s)=U(y − p) − s, or
UNI(y − p,s)=U(y − p − s).
In case of having treatment the utilities will be
UI(y − p − k ∗ c,0) = U(y − p − k ∗ c), or
UNI(y − p − k ∗ c,0) = U(y − p − k ∗ c) accordingly.
Using UI, given a cost, the individual will have an episode of illness treated when the
health penalty is larger than the health penalty threshold previously deﬁned:
s>e sI(c)=U(y − p) − U(y − p − k ∗ c), (5)
where k is the copayment rate. Notice that income, y directly inﬂuences e sI(c), therefore
income will inﬂuence the decision to have treatment. In this case, we will say that there
are income eﬀects. Notice that in this case, income and health are not directly comparable,
since the comparison is done by means of the marginal utility of income. Since the existence
or not of income eﬀects is a controversial issue in the literature, it is desirable to consider
a speciﬁcation where there are no income eﬀects. The second utility function is useful for
this purpose. For the second utility function the individual will have treatment when:
s>e sNI(c)=k ∗ c. (6)
In this case, health and money are directly comparable and there are no income eﬀects,
that is, income does not inﬂuence individual demand for treatment.
13As explained below, the subscript I will refer to income eﬀects, while NI refers to No-Income eﬀects.
15We still must give a functional form for U(.). The exponential utility function is very
convenient for our purposes. Ferrall and Shearer (1999) comment that from a compu-
tational standpoint, the exponential utility is perhaps the only feasible functional form
when solving the principal-agent problem.14 Support to the exponential utility is given by
Manning and Marquis (1996) and Marquis and Holmer (1996). Also using data from the
RAND HIE experiment, they both argue in favor of the constant absolute risk aversion
hypothesis. Therefore, based on both the complexities that arise using diﬀerent speciﬁca-
tions and the support found in favor of the constant absolute risk aversion hypothesis, we
will use
U(z)=−exp(−θz),
where θ stands for the constant absolute risk aversion coeﬃcient. Marquis and Holmer
(1996) found that θ did not vary with income or other demographics, so we will not
parametrize it as a function of individual characteristics.
4.2 The likelihood function
Estimation will be done by maximum likelihood. Here we will give its formulation.
Whether the individual had treatment or not gives us diﬀerent information. For indi-
viduals with treatment, we can observe the cost of the treatment, however this is not the
case for individuals without treatment. This is a sample selection issue that the model
must accommodate.











lnci − αln(s +1 )− xciβc
σc
;ρ)∂s, j = I,NI. (7)
The integral above is the probability of having treatment at cost ci. T h i si st h ea r e ao f
the density function (4) in the region at which it is optimal to have treatment. As given
by (5) or (6), this occurs when the health penalty is large enough. We emphasize that, in
general, the integration limit depends on the utility function used.
14Others authors that have used the exponential utility function are Towsend (1994), Mace (1991),
Haubrich (1994) and Marigotta and Miller (2000).
















lnc − αln(s +1 )− xciβc
σc
;ρ)∂s∂c, j = I,NI.
(8)
where Φ(.) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standardized normal. This
ﬁrst term is the probability of not being ill, while the second is the probability of being
ill but with a health penalty not large enough to oﬀs e tt h em o n e t a r yo u to fp o c k e tc o s t s .
The cost has to be integrated out, since it is not observed for those that did not have
treatment.
Individuals with a copayment rate of zero, (k =0 ), do not pay anything for the treat-
ment. In this case, e sj(c) = 0 for all c. In this case, since the individual does not pay
anything, the second term of (8) vanishes and the integral in (7) has a lower limit of zero.
That is, the probability of having treatment is the probability of being ill. In this case,
even if we use the utility function that exhibits income eﬀects, income will not inﬂuence
the demand decision. The model that does not exhibit income eﬀects is robust to the
choice of the functional form U(.) since it does not enter in e sNI(c).




1[Ti =1 ]∗ ln(L1,i)+
N X
i=1
1[Ti =0 ]∗ ln(L0,i).
Computation of the log-likelihood function requires numerical integration. The inte-
gration over costs in done using Hermite quadrature which is specially convenient to deal
with integrands related to the normal density function (Judd 1998). To compute this
integral, one needs to write the likelihood in terms of exp(−ξ2)w h e r eξ is the variable to





As a result, we obtain integration limits that go from minus inﬁnity to plus inﬁnity, which
is an additional requirement to apply Hermite quadrature. The integral over s is done
by Legendre quadrature. This integration routine requires ﬁxing the limits of integration
to ﬁnite quantities. Therefore the plus inﬁnity in (7) was replaced by the mean of s
plus eight times its standard deviation. Since s is a normal random variable, this is
17practically the same as integrating up to inﬁnity. All the integration routines used are
Gaussian quadrature techniques that outperform the alternative Newton-Cotes formula
(Judd 1998). We used 16 points of quadrature in the Hermite integration and 24 in the
Legendre.15
4.3 Identiﬁcation
First of all, we would like to comment on the restriction imposed in the theoretical model
that both the illness process and the health penalty are generated by the same random
variable s. In order to consider a more general formulation where illness and health penalty
were generated by diﬀerent processes we would need to observe a variable indicating that
the individual was ill but decided not to have treatment. Since we only observe to have
treatment or not, we have to constrain to a unique process that determines both illness
a n dh e a l t hp e n a l t y .
In order to consider more issues related to identiﬁcation we will express the model in
the following way:
Pr(T =1 |c)=P r ( s>e sj(c)),j = I,NI (9)
lnc = αln(s +1 )+xcβc + εc,i f s > 0, where
s = xsβs + εs.
Uj(y − p,e sj(c)) = Uj(y − p − kc,0). (10)
Therefore it is a simultaneous equation model in which the dependent right hand side
variables are not censored and therefore we do not require any restriction for coherency
of the system. In order to obtain non-parametric identiﬁcation, it is necessary to have at
least one continuous restriction in both xs, and xc.
Another issue of concern is identiﬁcation of the parameters of the discrete choice equa-
tion. For the model that does not exhibit income eﬀects we have that equation (9) is




where εs = σsus,kis the copayment rate and therefore it is not a parameter to estimate,
but a data we condition on. Consequently, if there are enough observations with k>0
15The Hermite routine needs less points since it is designed to deal with normal related integrands as
ours. The Legendre is a more general purpose routine so we have chosen more points for the Legendre
than for the Hermite.
18then, σs is identiﬁed because the product kc changes among individuals. However, if
there are not enough elements in the sample for which k 6= 0, this might result in poor
identiﬁcation. For the model that exhibits income eﬀects, equation (9) is
Pr(T =1 |c)=P r ( us >
exp(−θy) ∗ (−1+e x p ( θkc)) − xsβs
σs
). (11)
In this case, the product kc is aﬀected by the parameter θ and therefore the previous
argument does not hold. Notice that since θ enters non linearly in the fraction, this might
allow us to identify the parameters of the model. However, identiﬁcation that relies on non
linear restrictions can give poor results. This is the case in our model and we have decided
to constrain one of the parameters. We use the value of θ estimated by Marquis and
Holmer (1996) that used also data from the RAND HIE. However, we will not constrain
θ directly, rather we will constrain for a value of σs that gives as a corresponding point
estimate for θ equals to the estimated value by Marquis and Holmer (1996). With this
strategy, all the observations in the sample will contribute to the identiﬁcation of the
parameters. If on the contrary, we constrained the value of θ directly, the observations
with k = 0 will not contribute to the identiﬁcation of the parameter because in that case
the ﬁrst term of the numerator of (11) vanishes.
5 Preliminary analysis
In this section we will analyze Tables 3 to 6 that show the results of a preliminary analysis
of the data. Table 3 shows how frequency of episodes treated varies with copayment rates.
Those that enjoy free care seek care more often than those that face cost-sharing contracts.
Diﬀerences among copayment plans are not so clear. This is not strange since Newhouse
et al. (1993) found that the largest decrease in use of outpatient services occurs between
t h ef r e ea n dt h e0 . 2 5c o p a y m e n tr a t e . 16 From Table 3, it is clear that the copayment group
with less observations are those with 50% copayment. Table 4 shows the estimates of a
standard probit model for TREAT as a dependent variable. The results on the copayment
rates give us basically the same information that Table 3. The coeﬃcients of the dummy
variable for copayment groups are negative and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that
copayment inﬂuences the probability of having treatment in the expected way. Apart
16Furthermore, in table 4.8 in Newhouse et al. (1993) the coeﬃcients over the 0.5 and 0.95 copayment
rates were very similar (-0.46 vs -0.49) in a Negative Binomial regression of number of acute episodes.
19from copayments, other signiﬁcant variables are FEM and GHEA. As expected, women
are more likely to have episodes treated then men. People with poor health conditions
also have episodes treated with greater frequency. AGE and DISEA have expected signs
but they are not statistically signiﬁcant. In fact, GHEA is an index of general health that
might measure health capital better than other more crude proxies as age or the number of
chronic diseases. On top of this, we are only considering people older than 17 and younger
than 62, what might be contribute to not to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of age.
Table 5 shows how the average of episode treatment cost for those treated varies with
copayment rates. As our theoretical demand model predicted in section (2.2), it seems
clear that the higher the copayment rate, the lower is the average observed cost. According
to our model, the higher the copayment rate, the more inexpensive the treatment has to
be in order to ask for treatment, given an illness episode of the same severity. Therefore,
one expects to observe this pattern in the costs per episode treated.
T a b l e6s h o w saO L Sr e g r e s s i o nf o rl n ( c) over covariates and dummies for copayments,
for those people that had a episode treated in the ﬁrst month of the third year. Age
have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the logarithm of costs per episodes. Since we
have 248 observations on this regression it is hard to ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects, given the
variability that medical costs usually have. APPT, AVSP and AVMD are the individual’s
satisfaction with the length of time for a medical appointment, as well as satisfaction
with medical specialists and family doctors respectively. We interpret them as capacity
indicators: a higher satisfaction implies a higher capacity and then smaller costs. The
signs are consistent with this interpretation and APPT is statistically diﬀerent from zero
at 14%. The eﬀect of copayments in the logarithm of observed costs per episodes have
the expected sign, but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero except for the one with 50%
copayment.17 Keeler and Rolph (1988) and Newhouse (1993) obtain the same conclusion
using data from all the sample period, and not only the ﬁrst month as we do here.
In this section we have accomplished two objectives. First, we have assessed which
covariates are statistically signiﬁcant for the two dependent variables of interest: treatment
decision and cost per episode. Second, we have checked that though we restrict ourselves
to the ﬁrst month of the third year of the experiment, we obtain the same conclusions
that previous analyst have obtained using the whole sample period: copayments mainly
17As it is expected from the random assignment of copayments, the conclusions are the same if we do
not use any covariates in the regression except the copayment dummies.
20inﬂuence the decision to have medical episodes treated while copayments very weakly
inﬂuence costs per episodes Keeler and Rolph (1988) and Newhouse (1993).18
6 Structural estimation results
6.1 Model results
In this section we will comment on the results obtained in the estimation of the model
d e v e l o p e di ns e c t i o n( 4 ) .F i r s t l y ,w ec o m m e nt on the exclusions restrictions made in Xs,X c
which are necessary to non parametrically identify the model. The variables APPT, AVMD
and AVSP are satisfaction variables related to the capacity of doctors in the area where the
participants live. Assuming that capacity translates to cost of treatment, in the sense that
a larger capacity implies smaller costs because of more severe competition in the market,
then these variables should not inﬂuence health, conditional on costs. Hence, we do not
include them in Xs. APPT, AVMD and AVSP are good instruments since its inclusion
in the OLS regression of costs presented in the previous section doubled the value of the
R2 statistic. From Xc we exclude SOC, which is a social contact indicator, since it did
not turn out signiﬁcant in the OLS regression presented in the previous section and its
t-statistic in the probit regression is not very low (-1.46).19 On top of this, we do not
have any a priori reason to think why an index of social contacts might inﬂuences costs of
treatment, nor we have found evidence of this in the literature.
We estimated the structural models presented in section (4), both the model with
income eﬀects and the model without income eﬀects. As we mentioned above, the scale of
the model with income eﬀect is not identiﬁed, unless a parameter is ﬁxed. We decided to
ﬁx the risk aversion coeﬃcient to θ =0 .00309, which is the value estimated by Marquis
and Holmer (1996) for the same dataset that we are using.20 We found α to be negative
18When we repeated the exercise for the ﬁrst month of the second year, we found signiﬁcant eﬀects
of copayments on costs. This made us think that the ﬁrst month of the second year was not a good
representative of the information contained in the experiment, and the we decided to concentrate on the
third one.
19T h ef a c tt h a tav a r i a b l ei sn o ts i g n i ﬁcant in the OLS regression for costs presented in the previous
section does not directly implies that it was not in the cost function of our structural model. In the
structural model we have a cost function unconditional on the event of treatment, while the OLS regresion
of the previous section was conditional on that. Still we think that the OLS results are a useful guide to
specify the structural model.
20The value of 0.00309 is expressed in 1973 dollars, as income and costs are.
21and not statistically signiﬁcant from zero (t-values:-0.761 and -0.632). We checked the
robustness of our results to functional form, but the negative sign persisted. Given that
it is quite implausible to think that costs decreases with health severity, we think that
the negative sign is a indication that the size of the true eﬀect must be quite small and
consequently we decided to estimate both models with α restricted to zero. We highlight
that this does not mean that health severity does not inﬂuence costs. Costs and health
severity are still related through their correlation between unobservables: εs and εc.
Tables 7 to 9 show the estimation results of the structural models. Table 7 reports the
estimates of the severity equation. The two models measure severity in a very diﬀerent
way: the model with income eﬀect measures severity in utility units of consumption,
while the model without income eﬀect measure it in monetary terms. That is the reason
why the size of the coeﬃcients diﬀer very much. As in the probit regression presented
in the previous section, the statistically signiﬁcant variables are FEMALE and GHEA.
Other variables as AGE and DISEA have the expected signs, but they are not statistically
signiﬁcant from zero at 95% conﬁdence level.
Table 8 shows the results for the cost equation. In line with the OLS regression of the
previous section, we do not have signiﬁcant variables, except the constant term and AVSP
in the model for the no income eﬀect model. We would like to highlight that even the OLS
regression showed this lack of signiﬁcance, hence it is not due to our structural model but
to the number of observations with positive costs (248). Whether this is a major problem
or not depends on the use of these estimates. We do not plan to assess how changes in
the covariates inﬂuence our policy function (optimal contract), but to obtain treatment
cost for a representative individual with covariate values the sample average. Hence, we
do not see it as a major inconvenience.
Table 9 presents the value of ρ, the correlation coeﬃcient between the unobservables:
εs and εc. We highlight that in both models it is positive, quite high and statistically
diﬀerent from zero. Consequently, our model predicts that costs increase positively with
severity in a stochastic fashion.21 As we will explain in depth below, this high correlation
means that the insurer can learn much about the severity by observing the cost.
21This is not due to restricting alpha to be zero. In the unrestricted model, the correlation coeﬃcient
took a value of 0.78 and 0.85 in the income and no income eﬀect model respectively.
226.2 Model evaluation
The purpose of this section is twofold: to compare the relative performance of both models,
as well as to analyze the suitability of the structural models.
We have computed the value of Andrews’ (1988) goodness of ﬁt test for both models.
This is a conditional moment test for the diﬀerence between the average estimated prob-
ability of TREAT=1 and the frequency of ones in the sample. We obtained a P-value of
0.70 for the model with income eﬀects and a P-value of 0.87 for the model without income
eﬀects, consequently none of the structural models is rejected at usual conﬁdence levels
by this test.
In Tables 10 and 11, we show the results of montecarlo simulations based on 5000
replications of the model using our sample. In the second column of both tables 10 and 11
we report the frequency of treatment and average observed costs by copayment rates that
we ﬁnd in the data. Under the columns labelled “Mean” we report the point predicted
value that we obtain using the simulations. The P2.5 and P97.5 columns refer to the
2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of the series of simulated values. They cannot be interpreted as
conﬁdence intervals since they just pick up the uncertainty of the error terms, but not
the one related to the parameter estimates.22 Therefore, it is likely that the conﬁdence
intervals are wider.23 In table 10, we do not observe any large diﬀerence between the mean
frequencies of treatment and its real value. The larger discrepancy is for 50% copayment
group, however this is group with smaller sample size. Overall, the model with no income
eﬀects ﬁts better the frequencies of treatment as expected from the selection test previously
presented. Table 11 give the equivalent results for the other dependent variable: observed
costs. For the 0% and 25% copayment group, the mean predictions of the model are
very close the to the real value. The prediction for the 50% copayment group presents the
largest discrepancy, though this is the group with smaller sample size, thus the uncertainty
around the average real value is also larger. The point prediction for the group with 95%
copayment is a bit closer to the real value for the model with income eﬀects, that for the
model without income eﬀects. However, the real value is within the uncertainty bands that
we have built for the model with no income eﬀects. Overall, it seems that both models
22In order to provide conﬁdence intervals, one would have to bootstrap, which in our case is computa-
tionally very costly.
23We present these percentiles in order to have a ﬁrst measure of uncertainty around the mean value of
the prediction when the model paramaters are considered ﬁxed.
23are able to provide predictions reasonably close to real values in both dependent variables
of the models.
7 Solving the principal agent problem
Once one has estimated the parameters of the principal-agent problem, one can solve for
the optimal contracts and therefore estimate them. This is possible thanks to the fact that
we have estimated the parameters of the theoretical model in the previous section. In this
section, we will deﬁne the optimal contracts: the ﬁrst best, the second best and optimal
copayment. We would like to highlight that, for the estimation, we did not need to assume
that contracts were optimal. This was possible thanks to the experimental design of the
data we used.
It is important to describe the timing of events as well as the contractibility assump-
tions. At t = 1, the contract is oﬀered to the individual. The contract might specify the
premium p, the cost sharing function D(.), and, if possible, the region of the (s,c)s p a c e
at which treatment will be covered by the insurance scheme. The cost sharing function
D(.) will specify how much the individual will pay out of pocket for receiving the medical
treatment. She accepts or rejects. If she accepts, at t =2 ,s h ew i l lo b t a i nad r a wo f( s,c)
from the joint distribution gs,c|s,c . If she is ill, s>0, conditional on the contract, the
individual will decide to have treatment or not. At this stage, the individual knows the
realization of the two random variables. In the First Best, the two random variables are
contractible. However in the second best case, the only contractible variable is the cost,
and the health penalty shock will be individual’s private information. This informational
asymmetry is the source of moral hazard.24
In the ﬁrst best problem, since both costs and health penalty shock are contractible,
the insurer does not need to assume that the individual will behave optimally. That is, the
contract oﬀered to the individual will be a complete contingent plan on both s and c,t h a t
maximizes her expected utility conditional on the zero proﬁt restriction for the insurance
company, which comes from the assumption on competition.25 The ﬁr s tb e s tc o n t r a c t
24We say this is a moral hazard problem since it is an informational asymmetry after the signature of
the contract (Laﬀont-Tirole 1993, Macho and P´ erez 1993). Since it is more an informational advantage
than an action, other authors would call it hidden information.
25In fact, the problem could easily be re-speciﬁed to allow for a positive level of expected proﬁts. By
solving the problem for diﬀerent level of proﬁts one would obtain the utility-proﬁt frontier.
24would determine a premium, a cost sharing function that depends on both s and c,a sw e l l
as in which combinations of (s,c) this cost sharing function applies. On one hand, since we
have two contractible variables, the ﬁr s tb e s ti sd i ﬃcult to characterize since one must ﬁnd
the region of (s,c) for which the insurer will cover treatment costs.26 On the other hand,
though the ﬁrst best solution is usually an interesting benchmark from the theoretical
point of view, it does not provide any policy function. Hence we will concentrate on
solving the second best, that is, the optimal contract under no contractibility of severity.
7.1 Optimal contract
The second best problem assumes that the insurer can just contract on the costs but not
on the health penalty shock. Moreover, since there is noise between these two random
variables (εs and εc are not perfectly correlated), the insurer cannot perfectly recuperate
the health penalty from the observed cost. Consequently, in the second best problem no
argument of the contract can depend on the health penalty shock. Therefore, the second
best contract will be
csb = {p,D(c)},
where p is the premium and D(c) the cost sharing function. The cost sharing function
will give how much the individual will pay out of pocket for receiving medical treatment
which costs c. At the second best, the insurer cannot design a region of (s,c)f o rw h i c h
treatment is covered, since s is not contractible. On the contrary, the insurer will take
into account that the insured will behave optimally according to his optimal decision rule
(3). Therefore, if the treatment episode is c, the individual will demand treatment when
s>e s(c)w h e r ee s(c) is implicitly deﬁned by U(y − p,e s(c)) = U(y − p − D(c),0).
26The second best will be easier to characterize becuase the relation between severity and costs are given
by the incentive compatibility constraint which is known in our problem.
25The second best problem is deﬁned by
Max
{P,D(c)}











U(y − p − D(c),0)gs,c|s(s,c)∂s∂c.





(c − D(c))gs,c|s,c(s,c)∂s∂c. (13)
U(y − P,e s(c)) = U(y − p − D(c),0). (14)
Notice that the problem has two constraints. The ﬁrst one ensures that the insurance
contract is optimally fair, that is the premium is equal to the expected cost. The function
that appears on the integration limit is a constraint given by the optimal individual’s
behavior.
7.2 Approximate solution to optimal contract
One of the advantages of structural estimation is the possibility to solve for policy mea-
sures. This is possible because one recuperates the raw parameters of the theoretical
model. In this case, we are interested in obtaining the optimal contract, or an approxi-
mation to it. This is done by ﬁnding the premium p and cost-sharing function D(c)t h a t
solves the principal-agent problem above.
Principal-Agent problems often lack of closed form solution. See, for instance Haubrich
(1994) and Judd (1998) to ﬁnd examples of problems solved by numerical methods. Our
problem is quite complicated and hence we will also solve it using numerical methods. In
order to solve the problem, we need to solve for the premium p, and the function D(c).
The way we will approach the problem is to parametrize D(c)i naﬂexible way and then
ﬁnd the value of the parameters that solve the maximization problem. We have chosen
the following parametrization
D(c|a0,a 1,a 2,a 3)=L(a0 + a1 ∗ c + a2 ∗ c2 + a3 ∗ c3) ∗ c (15)
where L(.) stands for the cumulative distribution function of the Logistic. This parametriza-
tion has the advantage that restricts the value of D(c)t ob eb e t w e e n0a n dc, since a
cumulative distribution function always takes a value between 0 and 1. T h ea r g u m e n to f
26L is a polynomial what allows the function D(c)t of o l l o waﬂexible proﬁle on c.27
We have used Simulated Annealing as maximization routine. This is a very robust
random search algorithm that is able to escape from local optima. It also easily allows
to restrict the value of the variables to maximize within a certain bounds, which is very
useful to avoid overﬂows (Goﬀe et al. 1994). 28 This maximization algorithm does not
need to take derivatives and it only needs to evaluate the function. The coeﬃcients of the
polynomial are the inputs to the maximization routine. At each combination of polynomial
coeﬃcients, we numerically solve the premium constraint and then evaluate the objective
function. The solutions to the problem with income eﬀects are found in table 12 and some
values given by the cost-sharing function in table 13.
As it is clear from table 12, the percentage that the consumer pays out of pocket
decreases from 81% when medical costs are $1, to 46% when medical treatments are $125.
The out of pocket function, D(c), shows a concave pattern that gives more coverage to
the individual in case of higher costs. Given the high correlation between severity and
costs unobservables (0.735), the optimal contract gives a higher coverage when illness are
more likely to be severe. This concave proﬁle is frequently observed in health insurance
contracts: they do not provide coverage at low costs, for higher costs they cover a ﬁxed
percentage and when costs exceeds and upper bound, the insurance company cover all the
costs (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000). We must point out that the cost sharing numbers
should include other monetary and non-monetary costs of having treatment, apart from
medical costs, since we have not considered them in the estimation.
The premium that corresponds to the approximation found to the optimal contract is
$1.27. In order to give a correct interpretation to this parameter, one should have in mind
that it is in 1973 dollars and that the insurance contracts refers to acute conditions that
do not need hospitalization and only for those illnesses that start in a given month. We
also estimated more simple contracts that yield a smaller level of utility. The estimated
value of the optimal deductible corresponds to $42, while the estimated optimal copayment
corresponds to 63%. From a comparison of the optimal copayment and the cost sharing
values obtained in table 12 for the optimal contract, it is clear that non linear contracts
27O n ec o u l di n c o r p o r a t ef u r t h e rt e r m si nt h ep o l y n o m i a l . W ec h o s e dat h i r dd e g r e ep o l y n o m i a ls i n c e
the results were very similar to the ones given by a second degree polynomial.
28The optimal values found are in the interior of the speciﬁed bounds and then the optimal values do
not hit the constraint.
27give more generous coverage at high values of the costs.
Even if extensive previous work has been done using the RAND Health Insurance
Data, it is diﬃcult to compare our results with those in previous work. Firstly, our model
deals with illness episodes that starts in a month, rather that all the illness episodes of a
year. Secondly, we have not included chronic expenditures as they are not random, nor
episodes that have required hospitalization. As Belsey(1988) points out, diﬀerent health
care services will require optimally diﬀerent cost sharing rules, as they have diﬀerent
elasticities. Hence, we have chosen to follow this recommendation and focus only on acute
episodes that has not required any hospitalization.
7.3 Moral hazard measure
In this subsection we will give a new measure of the extent of moral hazard. The health
economics literature has traditionally relied on the elasticity of utilisation with respect to
insurance coverage. As we pointed out in the introduction, the suitability of this measure
relies on the absence of income eﬀects. Moreover, it is not directly linked to the extent
to which informational asymmetries are important. The measure we will propose here is
completely related to informational asymmetries and it does not hinge on the existence of
income eﬀects. The availability of this measure is a product of our modelling choice: to
do a clear distinction between contractible and non contractible variables.
Given that moral hazard occurs because severity s is not contractible, there is moral
hazard unless we can recuperate s from the observed costs c. If the correlation between εs
and εc was one then there would be a one to one non relation between s and c.T h i sw o u l d
allow to recuperate s from c, given both principal and agent know the parameters of the
model. Consequently, it will be the same to contract on both s and c that only on c and
there would not be moral hazard. This form the basis for our measure of moral hazard:
ρ. Moral hazard will be more prevalent the closer ρ will be to zero, since then there is no
any stochastic relation between contractible and non contractible variables. In our case,
we estimated ρ to be 0.735. Though there is lack of experience with this measure to know
in what extent 0.73 is high or low, it seems moderately close to one and hence the extent
of moral hazard seems reduced.
288 Conclusions
Unlike previous empirical research, we have used the Principal-Agent paradigm to estimate
the optimal insurance contract for reimbursement health care insurance. Consequently,
the optimal contract is derived from ﬁrst principles and it is robust to the presence of
income eﬀects. The empirical implementation allows to estimate a new measure of moral
hazard based on the correlation between unobservables inﬂuencing contractible and non
contractible variables. We have also disentangled the treatment decision from the cost
of treatment, following previous research that attributed to the consumer the decision
whether to seek treatment or not, while the cost decision is mostly left to the doctor.
The data that we use come from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, a social
experiment conducted between 1975 and 1982 in six diﬀerent cities of USA. Families
participating in the experiment were randomly assigned to insurance plans, what allows
to consider the insurance status as exogenous. Estimation of the structural parameters
was carried out by maximum likelihood with numerical integration to accommodate that
costs of treatment are only observed for those that decided to seek medical treatment.
Our theoretical model predicts the empirical pattern than observed costs are decreasing
w i t ht h ec o p a y m e n t . T h i si sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a tp e o p l ew i t hh i g hc o p a y m e n tw i l lo n l y
seek treatment in case it is inexpensive enough. We estimate a high correlation between
unobservables inﬂuencing severity and those inﬂuencing costs, what reduces the extent
of moral hazard. The optimal out of pocket function shows a concave proﬁle on costs,
providing a larger coverage for episodes with larger costs. Given the high correlation
between severity and costs, this means that the optimal insurance contract provides a
more generous coverage in case of severe illness episodes.
Due to lack of data, we have not considered the optimal mix of consumer and provider
incentives (Ellis and McGuire, 1993). Consequently, we have look for the optimal insurance
contract restricted to the set of those that only gives incentive to the consumer. Finally, we
would like to point out that this paper has followed the tradition of a sovereign consumer
that is able to evaluate correctly health status, and in particular for our model, severity.
More research is needed to evaluate this point and its consequences. We expect that
this paper might also be useful for those incorporating non monetary costs in consumer
behaviour and its consequences over insurance coverage.
299T a b l e s
Table 1 Distribution of number of
episodes that started in the ﬁrst month





30Table 2. Description of variables
Variable Mean S.D. Description
Endogenous
Treat 0.13 0.33
=1 if treated by an episode that started
in the ﬁrst month, 0 on the contrary
Costs 29.23 44.36 episode treatment cost. 1973 dollars
Exogenous
Copay 0.31 0.37 copayment rate: 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.95
Inc 469.2 399.9
montly per-capita family income
at enrollement. 1973 dollars
Fem 0.55 0.49 =1 if female
Ghea 0.70 0.14
general health index divided by 100.
Higher values indicates better health
Soc 0.70 0.24
index of social contacts divided by 100
Higher values indicates more contacts
Educ 1.21 0.29 Number of years of education divided by 10
Disea 1.21 0.88
Index for number of diseases divided by 10
Higher values indicates more diseases
Age 3.64 1.16 age divided by 10
Appt 0.44 0.29
Satisfaction with length of wait for medical appointments
Higher values indicate greater satisfaction. Divided by 100
Avmd 0.39 0.24
Satisfaction with availability of family doctors
Higher values indicate greater satisfaction. Divided by 100
Avsp 0.55 0.26
Satisfaction with availability of medical specialists
Higher values indicate greater satisfaction. Divided by 100




Copay. 0 832 0.17
Copay. 25 472 0.13
Copay. 50 146 0.08
Copay. 95 415 0.09









Copay. 25 -0.19 (0.09)
Copay. 50 -0.42 (0.16)
Copay. 95 -0.39 (0.10)


















Copay. 25 -0.05 (0.16)
Copay. 50 -0.56 (0.31)
Copay. 95 -0.08 (0.19)
33Table 7. Estimates of Severity equation
With Income No Income
Coeﬃcient Se Coeﬃcient Se
Constant -0.052 0.047 -29.23 22.46
Ghea -0.119 0.055 -60.23 26.36
Soc -0.034 0.023 -16.2 10.82
Female 0.032 0.015 16.39 6.9
Age -0.009 0.006 -3.53 2.81
Disea 0.007 0.008 3.3 3.98
Table 8 Estimates of Cost equation
Income Eﬀect No Income Eﬀect
Coeﬃcient Se Coeﬃcient Se
Constant 2.555 0.573 2.347 0.593
Education -0.135 0.212 -0.078 0.215
Disea -0.093 0.098 -0.081 0.101
Ghea -1.105 0.638 -1.088 0.659
Age 0.102 0.069 0.117 0.074
Appt -0.454 0.249 -0.479 0.253
Avmd -0.36 0.289 -0.321 0.298
Avsp -0.463 0.246 -0.487 0.246
Table 9. Estimates of the cholesky
decomposition and other information of interest.
Income Eﬀect No Income Eﬀect
Coeﬃc i e n tS eC o e ﬃcient Se
a 0.153 0.052 78.204 20.238
b 0.989 0.246 1.059 0.264
c -0.911 0.063 0.899 0.072
ρ∗ 0.735 0.09 0.76 0.09
Log-lik -1754.39 -1752.192
P-Andrews 0.7 0.87
The value of ρ is obtained from the estimates of b and c.
Its standard error is computed using the delta method.
34Table 10. Predictions of frequency of treatment
Copay Real Income eﬀects No Income eﬀects
P2.5 Mean P97.5 P2.5 Mean P97.5
Copay 0 0.17 0.120 0.143 0.168 0.126 0.150 0.174
Copay 25 0.13 0.103 0.134 0.165 0.105 0.135 0.165
Copay 50 0.08 0.075 0.122 0.178 0.068 0.116 0.171
Copay 95 0.09 0.084 0.114 0.147 0.074 0.101 0.130
Table 11 Predictions of observed costs
Copay Real Income eﬀects No Income eﬀects
P2.5 Mean P97.5 P2.5 Mean P97.5
Copay 0 31.8 23.7 31.2 41.7 24.6 32.4 43.6
Copay 25 28.6 19.5 27.7 39.5 19.7 27.8 39.1
Copay 50 13.9 14.3 26.8 48.0 13.5 24.8 41.7
Copay 95 25.0 16.4 23.4 33.2 14.3 19.7 26.6







Table 13 Cost sharing values given by optimal contract
cD (c) D(c)/c
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